Since the Cold War regime change has taken on new meaning. In the wake of American operations in Grenada, Panama, and the post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan, the idea gained currency that increasing the number of democratic governments in the world makes America safer. Yet the record is poor. Forcibly removing foreign leaders often results in unintended consequences, whether the goal is spreading democracy or advancing economic interests. The reason is that regime change policies essentially reverse the Westphalian presumption of sovereignty: what happens inside a country’s borders no longer matters to outsiders, and it becomes the business of other nations to intervene whenever they believe that what is occurring in another state will harm their interests.
The problem is that regime change is often difficult, if not impossible, to do well. Successfully overthrowing a government requires careful planning, international support, and a population in the target country ready to embrace change. If any of these conditions are not met, the mission can quickly devolve into a power vacuum and the risk of violence rises.
The academic literature demonstrates that there are a number of ways to undermine the success of regime change missions. The most common mistake is to focus on the desirability of the goals rather than understanding the full resources required to achieve them. To avoid this trap, policymakers must recognize the contingent nature of regime-change missions and the high probability of failure.
About the Author
